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740 PEOPLE v. WHITE C.2d 
G613. In Bank. Dec. 
'I' HE JOSEPH 
Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-Asking Improper Ques-
tions.-'rrial court's that distriet attorney in faith 
who had testified to defendant's reputation and 
whether witness had heard of homo-
sexual activities carried on by defendant is supported by 
prosecutor's that such was based on in-
formation gained from oral reports and written arrest reports 
of certain that he had conferred with other members 
in his office concerning legal point involved, and that con-
sensus of opinion was that question was proper. 
[2] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions- Failure to In-
struct.-Court's failure to instruct jury on its own motion that 
questions asked defendant's character witness concerning re-
ports of defendant's homosexual activities are not proof of 
facts therein contained and are not to be considered as evi-
dence did not result in prejudice where no instruction to such 
effect was requested, and where witness gave a negative 
answer. 
[3] Witnesses-Impeachment- Confessions.-While a confession 
not shown to have been freely and voluntarily made cannot be 
used for purpose of impeachment, when no objection has been 
made in trial court as to involuntariness and no evidence is 
presented to show involuntariness of confession, it is not error 
to admit it for purpose of impeachment. 
[4] Criminal Law-Instructions-Presumption of Innocence.-An 
instruction that "If, when considering all the evidence, the 
jury are satisfied to a moral certainty and beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant is guilty, then the presumption 
of innocence no prevails and you should find the de-
fendant guilty" is not subject to objection of suggesting a 
distinction between objective evidence and presumption of 
innocence and depriving defendant of right to have all evi-
dPnce, including presumption, considered until a vcrdiet waB 
reached. 
See CaLJur., Witnesses, § 132; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 773. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 611; [2] Criminal 
Law,§ 1437(9); Witnesses,§ 255; [4] Criminal Law,§ 796(4); 
[5] Criminal Law, 1432; [6] Criminal Law,§ 1414; [7] Criminal 
Law, § 325; [8] Witnesses, § 101; [9, 10] Criminal Law, 
§ 1322(1); [11] Criminal Law, § 1324(1); [12] Criminal Law, 
§ 1322 (2) [13-18] Jury, § 64.5; [19] Criminal Law, § 1384. 
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Hannless Error Instructions~ Evidence.·-· 
"other" before word "rational" in instruc-
tion tbat circumstances alone sufficient to convlet 
where irreeoneilable with rational conclusion" was not 
error where People's ease rested on direct 
<'vidence and was corroborated some circumstantial 
evidence. 
Id.~Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Where defend-
aut was with assault with intent to commit rape in 
llrst count with rape and commission of infamous crime 
nature in seeond and third counts and was a 
severance of flrst count, instructions that if jury found cer-
tain elements to he they were to flnd defendant guilty 
"as charg-ed" on second and third counts did not constitute 
pn•judicial reference to unmentioned first count. 
(7] !d.-Power and Conduct of Court.--Where improper questions 
are asked, court acts within scope of its duty in refusing to 
allow them to he answered, thoug-h no objection be made. 
[8] Witnesses- Questions- Argumentative Questions.- Purely 
argumentative questions asked witness are properly excluded. 
[9) Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Testi-
mony Inherently Improbable.-While appellate court will not 
uphold a judgment or verdict based on evidence which is in-
herently improbable, it is not sufficient that circumstances 
disclosed by testimony are merely unusual. 
[10] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Testimony In-
herently Improbable.-To warrant rejection of statements 
given by witness who has been believed by trier of fact, there 
must exist either physical impossibility that they are true or 
their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences 
or deductions. 
[11) !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Conflicting Evi-
dence.-Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to 
suspicion do not justify reversal of a judgment. 
[12] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Testimony In-
herently Improbable.-In prosecution for rape and for com-
mission of infamous crime against nature, certain testimony 
of complaining- witness, such as that her assailant helped her 
pick up contents of her purse, that he kissed her, that she went 
to work the next day, etc., was not so inherently improbable 
that it could not have been accepted by jury. 
[13] Jury-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.-
American tradition of trial by jury necessarily contemplates 
an impartial jury drawn from cross-section of community, and 
[13] Proof as to exclusion of or discrimination against eligible 
class or race in respect to jury in criminal case, note, 1 A.L.R.2d 
1291. See also Am.Jur., Jury, § 83 et seq. 
Certain Persons and Classes.-
political or eeonomic group, 
sox by officers of selection 
"'"'"Luu,'u"'"' of is in contrayention constitutional 
trial and of due process and equal protection of 
of Fourteenth Amendment of federal Constitu-
at least as against an accused on trial or be-
to class or race discriminated 
[15] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.-~ 
Merely because names on jury list are compiled in part from 
call. 
of directories such as ·who's Who, The Blue 
Register or club lists does not in itself condemn 
a whole or manner of its compilation, since clerk or 
commissioner is free to go to any source for persons to 
[16] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons or Classes.-
\Vhen all jurors or a predominant part of them are selected 
from private membership lists, basic concept of a jury panel 
representative of community is lost. 
[17] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.-
System of jury selection primarily from membership rosters 
of certain private clubs and organizations would normally 
tend to result in systematic inclusion of large proportion of 
business and professional people, and any systematic attempt 
to exclude wage earners cannot be permitted. 
[18] !d.-Selection-Exclusion of Certain Persons and Classes.--
Generally, errors and irregularities in making up jury list will 
not invalidate list when person objecting is not a member of 
group discriminated against. 
[19] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Jury-Selection.-
Though jury panel in question may have been selected in im-
proper manner, its actual composition did not result in sub-
stantial prejudice to defendant by reason of exclusion of mem-
bers of group to which defendant belonged where such panel 
consisted of 525 persons and where, notwithstanding defend-
ant's principal objection that of 73 individuals employed as 
workers only five were hourly workers, it appeared that of 
spouses of 178 panel members, 30 were hourly-rated workers, 
85 were salaried workers, 15, were ranchers and 48 were busi-
nessmen, thus showing that working people or spouses of 
such persons were represented on panel. 
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APPEAL from a 
Bernardino 
Martin J. 
Court of San 
a new triaL 
Prosecution for rape and for commission of infamous 
nature. of conviction affirmed. 
William B. Esterman and William B. Murrish for 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CAR'l'EH, J.-,Joseph White was charged in count I of an 
information with assault with intent to commit rape upon 
Velma Gonzales on November 17, 1952. In counts II and liT 
be wao; charged with rape and a violation of section 286* of 
the Penal Code committed upon Agapita Gallegas, both 
offenses alleged to have been committed on October 27, J 952. 
He pleaded not guilty as to each count and moved to chal-
lenge the jury panel upon the ground that there had been 
a systematic exclusion of Negroes, working people, men, and 
young persons. The motion was denied. Upon defendant's mo-
tion for a severance, the court ordered separate trials of the 
charges relating to each victim. Counts II and III were tried 
first and the ,jury found defendant guilty on both counts. He 
was sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by 
law as to each offense, the sentences to run concurrently. 
Count I was then dismissed. Defendant has appealed from 
an order denying his motion for a new trial and from the 
judgment. 
There was evidPnee presented at the trial to the effect that 
shortly after Mrs. Gallegas had left her place of employment 
in downtown San Bernardino, in the early evening of Octo-
ber 27, 1952, she was accosted and forced into an empty 
lot where her assailant raped her and committed a violation 
of Penal Code, section 286. On November 18, 1952, defendant 
was arrested and taken to the police station where he was 
identified by Mrs. Gallegas as her assailant. Mr. Parker, a 
parole officer for the California Youth Authority, testified 
that during an interview defendant made a statement admit-
*'' El'ery person who is guilty of the infamous crime against nature, 
eommittod with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprison-
ment in the state prison not less than one nor more than ten years.'' 
(Pen. Code, § 286.) 
PEOPLE C.2d 
commiSSIOn the crimes was also 
the (•ffect that defendant had confessed to 
in the presence of a shorthand 
who testified concerning the contents of 
the statement taken down him. Defendant made no argu-
ment the voluntary character of these confessions 
hut denied made them. 
mittcd 
com-
misconduct in the cross-examination of 
Maria Lawson, one of the character witnesses for the defense. 
Aftrr the witness had testified on direct examination as to 
l1efmdant 's good reputation in the community for chastity, 
virtue and she was asked on cross-examination: 
''Had yon heard that repor·ts had been given to the San Ber-
nardino Police Department that Joe ·white carried on homo-
,;exnal activities in Meadowbrook Park '' Defendant objectecl 
and moved to strike the question on the ground that it had 
been asked in bad faith and without factual basis. The 
objection was overruled but the court reserved a ruling on 
the motion to strike and the witness answered in the affirma-
tive. From her answer it was evident that she did not under-
stand the question and after the meaning of "homosexual" 
was explained to her, she stated that she had not heard such 
reports. A hearing was had (outside the presence of the 
jury) on the issue of the prosecutor's good faith in asking 
the question. At the hearing the prosecutor testified that 
his question was based upon information concerning defend-
ant's homosexual activities gained from oral reports and 
written arrest reports received from Officer A very of the 
San Bernardino Police Department, lVIr. Parker of the Cali-
fornia Yonth Authority and Mr. Hartley of the district 
attorney's office. He testified that he had researched the 
law on the propriety of such a question and had conferred 
with other members of his office about the legal point involved 
and that the consensus of opinion was that the question was 
a proper one. In view of this the trial court's finding that 
the question was asked in good faith and its refusal to strike 
the question are not without support. [2] In this connec-
tion it is also contended that the court erred in failing to 
give, of its o-..vn motion, an instrnction to the effect that 
qurstions concerning snch reports are not proof of the facts 
therein contained a11d arP not to be considered as evidence. 
Not only was such instructiOfl not asked for (People v. 
Stevens, 5 Cal.2d 92, 100 [53 P.2d 133]) but a negative 
745 
bcell obtainc•1l or 
t rne tl1at 11 confession uot shown to have been and 
vol made cannot be used for the purpose of impeaeh-
nwllt v. CaJ.App.2d 415, 419-420 [136 
'.2(1 626 J) ; howen·r, wl1en no has been made in 
the trial court as to inYolun!ariness and no evidence is pre-
~;enl(~d to show the inYoltmtariness of the confession, it is 
11ot error to admit it for the purpose of impeachment (People 
,~ J2 Ca1.2d 200, 210 P.2d 505]). 
It is w•xt eoniem1ed defendant that the court erred 
the r-y (1) on the of innocence; 
(2) on t·ireumstantial evidence; and ) "in unexplained 
n·fen'IH:l' to Couut:s [ r and HI." [ 4] \Vith to the 
(Jf imJO(:enee the eourt gave an instruction in 
of section 1096'~ of' the Penal Code and then 
'' ·when all the evidence, 
the jnry are satisfied to a moral certainty and beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant is then the 
of imlllt('nee no prevails and you should 
find the defendant " Defendant argues that these 
'A def<·rHinut in a eriruinnl nction is presumed to be innocent until 
n ncl in case of a reasonable doubt whether his 
l:e is c:ntitletl to an but the effect 
the state of proving 
n Heasona ble doubt is defined as 
not a mere possi blc doubt been use everything relating 
and on evidence, open to some 
Ol' tlrnt state of the case, which, after 
entire compnrison and eonsideration of all the leaves the 
minds of jurors in that contlition tlmt cannot feel an 
to a moral certainty, of truth ' '' 
error. 
circumstantial the court in-
folloiYS: ''Yon are not permitted on 
to find defcndaut guilty of 
any cnme Circum-
stances not with the that the 
defendant is but are irreconcilable with 
any rational conclusion.'' added.) Defendant 
argues that the omission of the word "other" before the 
word ''rational'' rendered the instruction ambiguous and 
-with the effect of the defendant of 
a trial. It is difficult to see how such an 
omission could have misled the Moreover, the People's 
ease restPd on direct evic1ence and was merely cor-
roborated some eircumstautial evidence. [6] 'l'he ref-
erences to eounts II and of which defendant eomplains, 
were mad•: ('OUrt in instructing the jury as to the 
form of the verdicts. The court instructed the jury 
that if fouml certain elements to be present they were 
to find defendant gu as " in count JI of the 
Inforlllatioa." reference to count III was similar. 
Defendant argues that this reference to counts II and III 
eould not have failed to <Honse the of the jury as 
to the existence and natnre of another unmentioned count. 
It is difficult to sf'e how any substantial prejudice conld hav•3 
rrsulted hom a mere refercnec of this nature. Indeed, 
if any was aroused the eonld well have thought 
that eount I had been (lismissed foe laek of evidcnee or that 
the dt>fendant had al berm acquitted of it. 
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in limit-
ing one phase of the cross-examination of the prosecutrix. 
'rhere is little merit in this contention. The incident com-
plained of arose after the prosecuting witness had explained 
Dec.1954] PEOPLE v. WHITE 




149 Cal. 435 
92 [232 P. 
[135 P.2d 24]; 





; People v. 
; Newsom v. Srniley, 57 
v. 70 CaL 
Defendant further contends that the of the com-
plaining >Yitness \Yas inherently in that she and 
her assailant would have reacted had she actually 
been raped. It is argued that certain such as 
that ber assailant l1elped her pick up the contents of her 
purse, that he kissed her, that she went to work the next 
day, etc., is unbelievable when considered with other factors. 
[9] It is true that an appellate court will not uphold a 
judgment or verdict based upon evidence which is inherently 
improbable; however, it is not sufficient that the circumstances 
disclosed by the testimony are unusual. (Kidroski 
v. Andr~rson, 39 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [103 P.2d 1000].) 
[10] As stated by this court in People v. Huston, 21 Cal.2d 
690, 693 [134 P.2d , '"l'o warrant the rejection of the 
statrments a witness who has been believed by a 
trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility 
that tl1ey are true, or their falsity must be apparent without 
resorting to inferences or deductions. (Back v. Farnsworth, 
25 Oal.App.2d 212, 219 [77 P.2d 295] ; Lufkin v. Patten-
Blinn Lumber 15 Cal.App.2d 259, 262 [59 P.2d 414]; 
Agoure v. Spinks Realty Co., 5 Oal.App.2d 444, 451 [42 P.2d 
660] ; Hughes Y. 1 Oal.App.2d 349, 354, 355 
[37 P.2d ; Powell v. Powell, 40 Cal.App. 155, 159 
[ 180 P. . ) [11] Conflicts and even 
is subject to justifiable do not 
of a judgment, for it is the exclusive nNnmnnA 
judge or to determine the 
limited classes of persons who did not represent a cross-section 
of the It appears that the panel, from which 
the for defrndant 's trial was selected, consisted of 525 
people, all of ·whom came from a number of townships in 
and around the of San Bernardino. A sampling taken 
of of this panrl indicated that approximately 53.32 
per cent were 14.8 per cent were businessmen 
and ·women, 10 per cent were retired businessmen, 17.34 
per cent were salaried \Yorkers, 1.27 per cent were hourly 
workers, 4 per cent were retired workers and 3.57 per cent 
were ranchers. Of the spouses of 178 of the members of the 
panel, ;jQ wrre \Yorkers, 85 were salaried workers, 
15 were ranclwrs and 48 were businessmen. On an age basis 
22.7 per eent of the panel were under 35 years 
of age, 35.4 per cent were in the 36 to 45 age group, 16.8 
per cent ·were in the 46 to 55 age group and the remainder 
were over 55 years of age. 
In explaining the method by which jury panels were 
selected, th0 jury commissioner testified that each year ques-
tionnairt's were sent to persons whose names appeared on 
the lists of organizations snch as the Rotary, 
Exchange Club. 20-30 Club, Chamber of 
on the membership lists of women's clubs. 
Questionnair('S were also to persons who volunteered 
and to those who were recommended by other citizens. Former 
jurors were frequently placed on the panel if they so re-
quested. The commissioner also testified that an attempt 
was made to as many businessmen on the panel as pos-
sible, because such people had in the past been excused 




was made to exclude persons 
were of the class. 
that '' 'l'hc American traditiou 
This does not mean, of course, that every 
of all the economic, 
political and geographical groups of the 
such would be impossible. 
But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected 
court officials without and intentional exclusion 
of any of these groups. Recognition must be to the fact 
that those eligible for service arc to be found in every 
stratum of '' v. Southern Pae. Co., 328 U.S. 
217, 220 [66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed. 1181, 166 A.L.R 1412]; 
sec also 31 Am.,Jur. 1953 Supp., Jury, § 83.) \Vhere no 
particular source is required by law, jury lists have been 
in various ways and from numerous general sources 
such as from directories v. 124 La. 378 
[50 So. 406] ) , from the of voters (People v. Hess, 
104 Cal.App.2d 642 P.2d 65] ; People v. Dessaure, 68 
.Y.S.2d 108 in 79 N.Y.S.2d 516]) and from 
v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928 [22 So.2d 
; United States v. Local 36 of International Fishermen, 
70 F.Supp. 782.) The principal requirement is that there 
should be no systematic and intentional exclusion of any 
group or groups of citizens from the prospective jury lists. 
(31 Am.Jur. 617-620, Jury, 83-88; 1 A.L.R.2d 1291-1398.) 
[14] It has been stated that any '' ... intentional, 
aml deliberate exclusion of or discrimination against 
members of a particular political or economic group, religious 
officers in charge of the selection and 
is in contravention of the constitutional 
to jury trial and of the 'due process' and 'equal pro-
tection of the laws' clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal at least as against an accused 
on trial or litigant bdonging to the class or race discriminated 
against." (31 .Am.Jur. 617.) [15] Just what does and 
States v. 








supra; Glasset' 315 U.S. 
86 L.Ed. .) 
of the courts has been to 
lists from membership rosters 
so as such sources 
lists such as city directories, 
voting lists, or directories (United States v. Local 
36 of International Fishermen, supra; United States v. Dennis 
supm) ; but when all jurors or a predominant part of them 
arc selected from priYate lists the basic concept 
of a of the community is lost. 
As stated United States, supra, 315 U.S. 
60, 86, ''. of the jury system, 
our requires that the jury be 
a 'body truly of the community,' and not the 
organ of any group or class. If that requirement 
is the officials with choosing federal jurors 
may exercise some discretion to the end that competent jurors 
may be called. But they must not allow the desire for 
competent to lead them into selections which do not 
comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of 
the community. no matter how slight, toward the 
selection of jurors by any method other than a process which 
will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining 
processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should 
be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing such tend-
encies may be of the best must not blind us to the dangers 
of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on this essential 
right. Steps innocently taken may, one by one, lead to the 
irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties. 
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ml'mbership roste:·s of' ce-rtain 
would normally tPrH1 to res11lt 
a of business 
a ddinitc 0xclnsion of ecri a in 
peop 1 e. wage earners 
cannot under our democratic be As stated 
in Thiel v. Southern I'ac. Co., supra, 328 U.S. 217, 222-224, 
a case which originated in the federal distril~t court in San 
:B'raneisco, the '' ... exclusion of all those who earn a daily 
wage eannot be federal or state law. Certainly 
nothing in the federal statutes warrants such an exdusion. 
And the California statutes are devoid of justification 
for the California hnv a wage earner 
may be as a A to be com-
petent, need only be a citizen of the United States over 
the age of of the state and for one 
of his natural faculties 
and not and possessed 
of the English language. California 
(§ 198.) (§ 199.) Nor is a 
daily wage earner listed among those from jury 
service. ( § 200.) And nnder the state 'A juror shall 
not be excused a court for slight or trivial causes, or for 
hardship, or for inconvenience to said but 
only when mate> rial or destruction to said juror's 
property or of entrusted to said is threat-
ened ( § 201.) 
''Moreover, the 




violence to the 
to sanction an exclusion 
would encourage whatever desires those 
the iielection of may have to discriminate 
persons of low eeonomic and social status. vYe would breathe 
life into any latent tendencies to establish the as the 
instrument of the and That 
we refuse to do.'' 
It is true that our United States Court has upheld 
the seleetion of so-called "blne ribbon" juries (Fay v. New 
York, 332 U.S. 261 S.Ct. 1613, 91 I_j.Ed. 2043]) but 
such has no application here. In the case of Fay v. New York, 
supra, the defendant did not object to the selection of the 
general panel of some 60,000 persons but only to the 
selection of the "blue ribbon" panel of about 3,000 which 
was sifted from the general Under the New York 
the panel was selected from all 
and from this a special "blue ribbon" 
panel for the trial of difficult and complicated cases was 
selected on the basis of qualifications. The selection of jurors 
under this favored those of superior qualifications 
for the panel but it did not discriminate against any 
social, or economic group nor against any religious 
faith or race. 
In the case at bar persons were not excluded from 
the list because were hourly wage earners 
or mcmbc·rs of a minority group but the system which was 
used would normally tend to exclude a large portion of such 
persous. 'l'he .im.r commissionrr testified that an attempt 
was made to many business people on the panel as 
possible. To such a purpose the commissioner, in 
compiling the relied almost entirely on the meinber-
ship rosters of dubs and organizations such as th2 
J_jions, wonwn 's cln bs and the Chamber of Commerce. 
Such a system would of necessity result in a jury list com-
\Ymn: 
2~8 P.~d 3' 
753 
aml those of less 
']'hose 
he so(• in l a]](1 eeonmn ii~ strata of the 
thi: of errtai n priyat<• 
""\ system whieh tends to permit this 
segmrnt of our eitizens 
tlw seli•etion of ;inrirs 
Sueh a ts 
dic;i·riwina1ory and shonld not be conclonecL 
qnP~i for 1 his (:on rt 's determina-
the ca,;:• at hat'. is whethr•r or not ihe trial eourt 
•·ommittC'd re dieial errm' in refnsing to dismiss the entire 
\\'en of thr opinion that under tbe faets hrre 
(l icl not. [18] It is generally recognized that 
rnle. (•rrors and rregnlarities in making up a 
not iJtYali(late the list wl1en the person obje(:ting 
1S not a llll'~JI!wr of the group discriminated against. (People 
14 Cal.2d 17, 19 [92 P.2d 387].) As stated 
. H css. 104 Cal. A pp.2d 642 [234 P.2d 6:5 I, "A 
dr· fc•JH1 ant if he is tried by an impartial jury 
more." 
[19] BH·n panel in question may have 
been selede<1 in an improper mamwr it eanuot be said that 
nd:wl resnlted in any substantial prejndie•' 
!o the def:·wlant b.1· rea'ioll of thr exclusion of members of 
lhe ~rronp to whi(•h def('JHlant belong(•d. The panel to which 
'lie 'j,. f':·nd<J nt '·on,;ist Pd of :J:?fi persons. A sampling 
tnlu·n of part of his p11nel indieated that 209 were house-
14 \\ere ranelwrs, 97 w•·re aetin• or retirrd bnsiness-
lll•'ll nnd \\.OllH'll and D1 \l'>"re :wtin~ or retired working people. 
Defl'ndanl 's prin(·i serms to be that of the 73 
as \Yorkers fi \Yrre hourly workers; 
h(rwr'H'l'. <JS pointed ont. of the spouses of 178 
ill\' pn11t>l nwtlJhei·s. :lO \H'n' l10nrl;:-rated workrrs, 85 were 
~a lari''• l 1 :J ranchers and 48 \Yere businessmen. 
!1 •.nnild 1h11s 11ppcar that >mrking people or the spouses 
or suvh perC'ons \H'rc represented on the panel. "More-
nwr, it is 110 (1<'llial of any eonstitutional right, eyen if there 
Wt'rr 110 persons on the jury panel belonging to the 'groups 
754 PEOPLE v. WHITE [43 0.2d 
or classes of persons to which the defendants belong.' Their 
right is to an 'impartial' It is the to 
and not to select them. 
68, 7 S.Ct. 30 L.Ed. 578; 
U.S. 8 S.Ct. 31 hEd. 80; Brown v. New Jersey, 
1899, 175 U.S. 1 20 S.Ct. 77, 44 L.Ed. 119 Howard v. 
200 .S. 26 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed. 421. 
To hold with the defendants in this connection would be to 
hold that as a matter of law an bias existed in the 
minds of persons of all other gToups than a defendant 
less of an actual state of mind. " (United States v. 
Local 36 of International supra, 70 F.Supp. 
782, 797.) 
The American system requires an jury drawn 
from a cross-section of the entire community and recog-
nition must be given to the fact that eligible jurors are 
to be found in every stratum of society. In selecting a 
truly representative jury panel, the membership lists of 
various clubs and organizations may properly be used, but 
they should not be relied on as the principal source of pros-
pective jurors nor should they be used to the complete ex-
clusion of other general sources more likely to represent a 
cross-section of the population, such as telephone directories, 
voting lists, and city directories. Any system or method of 
jury selection which fails to adhere to these democratic funda-
mentals, which is not designed to encompass a cross-section 
of the community or which seeks to favor limited social or 
economic classes, is not in keeping with the American tradi-
tion and will not be condoned by this court. 
In view of our previous discussion of the matter, defend-
ant's application to produce additional evidence, concerning 
the lack of good faith of the district attorney in his cross-
examination of character witness Maria Lawson, could serve 
no useful purpose and is hereby denied. 
From our examination of the record in this case, we find 
no error prejudicial to the rights of the defendant or which 
would justify a reversal of the judgment. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a 
new trial are, therefore, affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, .J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J. and Spence, .J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
26, 1955. 
